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A DYNAMIC MODEL OF ADVERTISING 
C O M P E T I T I O N : AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
OF FEEDBACK STRATEGIES 1 
P E T R M A R I E L 2 
This paper provides an empirical framework for estimating the parameters of a differ-
ential game of advertising competition taking into account the informative and predatory 
contents of advertising. The estimated model is a simultaneous equations model consisting 
of the firms' response functions and the profit maximizing first-order conditions. Haus-
man's specification test is used to examine the appropriateness of the Nash equilibrium 
assumption for the German automobile industry market. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The present study provides empirical investigation of dynamic advertising compe-
tition using a differential game model defined in [12]. This model resembles the 
Vidale-Wolfe generalizations and Excess advertising models but includes a new ef-
fect not considered in the previous models: the informative part of advertising. 
There is a large number of studies devoted to differential game models in the 
field of advertising. [24] provides a very extensive survey on optimal control theory 
applications to the fields of advertising including, among others, two large families 
of models: Advertising capital models (Nerlove-Arrow model) and Sales advertising 
respccse models (Vidale-Wolfe model). [20] surveys differential games in advertis-
ing and sums up conclusions of Vidale-Wolfe, Lanchester-type, 'Leitmann' , Excess 
advertising and Combined Vidale-Wolfe/excess advertising models. Another review 
of the existing literature can be found in the monograph [9] on dynamic models of 
advertising competition. 
Most of the studies in this field are, however, analytical investigations of a given 
model and only a few of them offer empirical validation of a proposed model. We 
could mention here as exceptions studies [2] and [1]. In the first study the authors 
derive open-loop and closed-loop equilibria for the Lanchester model of combat and 
estimate the discrete-time analog of the kinematic equations to simulate equilibrium 
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advertising policies in the soft-drink industry: Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola. They es-
t imate the market share response relationship as one equation separately from closed 
loop strategies. In the second study, the econometric framework is completely differ-
ent, as the estimation procedure accounts for the joint endogeneity of market shares 
and marketing efforts, tha t is, the market share and the advertising of competitors 
are assumed to be simultaneously determined. The authors use da ta from the phar-
maceutical, soft-drink, beer and detergent industries to carry out their empirical 
analysis based on the simultaneous equations system and test model misspecifica-
tion. The test does not reject no misspecification, so the proposed specification 
(modification of Case game, see [25]) is appropriate for all four industries. 
[10] is another paper which uses the Lanchester model as the basis for empirical in-
vestigation in two duopolies: Coca-Cola versus Pepsi-Cola (soft-drink industry) and 
Anheuser-Bush versus Miller (beer industry). The author considers market shares 
and advertising levels as a simultaneous system and after estimation of nonlinear 
relationships of the system, he carries out some tests to detect whether closed-loop 
equilibrium advertising strategies are used by the competitors rather than open-loop 
strategies. 
2. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF ADVERTISING COMPETITION 
AS A DIFFERENTIAL GAME 
As a basis for the empirical study I use a dynamic model of advertising competition 
defined in [12]. Consider a duopoly market. The two firms are denoted 1 and 2 and 
the advertising levels u± and u^ respectively. The following differential equations 
give the evolution of sales as a function of advertising levels: 
Xi(t) = Wi(ui(t)-Uj(t)) + Zi(ui(t) + Uj(t)) + Ki-aiXi(t) (1) 
Xi(0) = Xio>0, i,j = l,2 i^j. 
where (t) denotes time; a,iXi(t), with a; £ (0,1) , is the decay term and parameters 
di,Ki,Wi, and Zi are assumed to be non-negative and constant over time. 
The system dynamics (1) express two different effects of advertising. The first 
term on the right hand side of equation (1) is the business stealing effect. The 
second term on the right hand side is the total demand effect. In industries where 
advertising is mainly informative Z{ is expected to be relatively high with respect to 
Wi and in industries where it is very competitive zt- should be relatively low with 
respect to Wi. It is assumed that all the other factors affecting the growth of sales 
are collected in the constant K\. 
The objective of each firm i is to maximize the discounted sum of its instantaneous 
profit over an infinite time horizon: 
/ •OO 
J*= / e-rt[qiXi(t) -«?(*)]& (2) 
Jt0 
where a.-, the price-cost margin, is assumed to be constant over time, and r is the 
discount rate, common to both firms. 
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Firm i faces the problem of maximizing (2) subject to (1), U{(t) > 0 and Xi(t) > 0, 
with the initial state (to,X(0)) = (to,(Xio,X2o))- The appropriate framework for 
analyzing this problem is a differential game. The competing advertising strategies 
are developed using two kinds of Nash equilibria which are usually studied in the 
literature: open-loop, in which advertising is a function only of time, and feedback 
equilibria, which define advertising as a function not only of time but also the current 
state of the system. 
There is a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium for the differential game defined 
by (2) and (1). The equilibrium advertising levels are: 
3 f L = ( ^ + £07. -=1,2, (3) 
where 7. = j-f^-. 
In contrast to the open-loop Nash equilibrium, in the case of feedback equilibrium 
a firm cannot commit itself in advance to any given advertising spending path. 
The optimal advertising levels change in response to changes in the state variables 
X(t) = (Xi(t), Xj(t)). In an equilibrium in feedback strategies for the game, players 
are using optimal paths for the control variables U{, which are also optimal in every 
subgame. 
It is generally more difficult to obtain feedback strategies than open-loop strat-
egies as they usually involve partial differential equations. We can use the value 
fun tion approach in the above game to derive the feedback equilibria. We get the 
general form of the optimal strategy for firm i, proposing the value function as a 
quadratic polynom of the state variables (this restrcts our strategies to being linear 
in state variables, but this approach is usually used in the literature: see for example 
[15], [21] or [22]): 
FS _ Wj + Zj , Zj-Wj • (W_±__ • Zj - Wj , 
+ Г--4--4 + - - P - 4 1 * . (4) 
where rf, j = 2, 3 , . . . , 6; i = 1, 2, are unknown parameters which can be calculated as 
solutions of the system of twelve nonlinear algebraic equations obtained by equating 
coefficients of the state variables in the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation ([26]). 
In general, there are multiple feedback equilibria for the above game. One of them 
is for example the open-loop equilibrium, because c\ = %•, cl3 = c\ = c
l
5 = c\ = 0, 
i = 1,2 satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. This strategy is, however, 
a degenerate feedback strategy as in this case ufs does not react to changes in X{ 
nor Xj. The other solutions which define non-degenerate feedback strategies are so 
complicated that some simplification must be imposed in order to obtain closed-form 
equilibrium feedback strategies for both firms. 
First of all, let us assume symmetry between the two firms, (i.e. w\ = W2 = w, 
zi = Z2 = z, qi = q2 = q, a\ = 0,2 = a, K\ = K2 = K). The feedback strategies can 
then be found for the following three types of markets. The first types of market is a 
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market where advertising is mainly informative and increases demand for both firms 
(informative advertising; w = 0); the second is a market where every unit spent by a 
firm affects market share and so has a negative impact on the rival's sales (predatory 
advertising; 2 = 0); and the last is a market where the two effects are of the same 
size (informative and predatory advertising; w = z). Table 1 summarizes optimal 
strategies for the three different type of markets. See [12] and [11] for more details. 
Table 1. Feedback strategies for different type of markets. 
Type of Advertising Feedback strategy 
Informative (* = 0) u?Sp = - ^ + - ^ r ^ P - i + Xj) 
2a bz 
Predatory (w = 0) u f ^ = | « ^ + 2a + r _ 
v ' % 2 (a + 2r) Qw J 
D A * Art r ( \ FS1P ~q(w + z) K(2a + r) 2a + r 
Predatory and Informative (z=w) u- 1H = \-~, rA,-
J v v 2a a (w + z) 
The parameters c j , j = 2, 3 , . . . , 6; (i = 1,2) cannot be obtained for a general 
asymmetric case (z,- ^ Wi, Zi ^ Zj, Wi ^ Wj, Ki ^ Kj and Zi, Wi ^ 0) as a function of 
Zi, Wi, ai, Ki, (i —1,2) and r as has been done above for the three type of markets. 
But for given values of 2,-, it),-, a,-, Ki the parameters rf can be obtained through 
numerical methods. How the parameters z,-, iy,-, a{, Ki, (i = 1,2) can be estimated 
starting from sales and advertising expenditures data is shown in the next section. 
3. ESTIMATION P R O C E D U R E 
Our objective in this section is to see how to estimate the discrete-time analog of 
(1), where X{(t) = Xi)t - Xiit-i. 
Xit = Wi(uit - ujt) + Zi(uit + ujt) + Ki + (1 - a,-)A',It_i, (5) 
Define (zi + Wi) = ai and (z, — «;,) = /?,-. Then (5) can be rewritten as: 
Xu = OiiUu + PiUjt + Ki + (1 - ai)Xi)t-i. (6) 
As stated in [10] and [1], when we accept the Nash equilibrium as the appropriate 
solution concept, the equilibrium levels of advertising efforts derived from the first 
order necessary conditions for Nash equilibrium are usually functions of sales (or 
market share) level. For the above game for example, the first order necessary 
conditions for Nash equilibrium define feedback strategies which are linear in the 
state variables (see (4)): 
«fS - feii + ki2X{ + ki3Xj i, j = 1,2, i -£ j . (7) 
Tha t is why the advertising efforts Uj, and Uj cannot be considered exogenous vari-
ables. If we do not take into account the endogeneity of Uj, and Uj and estimate 
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parameters a,-, /?,-, K{, and (1 
mators will be inconsistent. 
a,) from the relation (6) directly by OLS, the esti-
We define an econometric model as a system of simultaneous equations which 
consists of response functions (6) as well as the equilibrium conditions (7). This is 
called the joint estimation approach. 
X\t = ct\ult + /3\u2t + K\ +(l - a i )x i i ( ť _i)- | - vlt 
X2t = a2u2t +(32ult +K2 + (l-a2)X2t(t_\) + v2t 
u\t = k\\ + k12X\t + kí3X2t + v3t 





The variables vn, i = 1, 2, 3. 4 denote random error terms which are assumed to have 
a joint distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix £1. These four equations 
represent the econometric formulation of the dynamic model we proposed in the 
previous section. 
It is easy to see that parameters a,, /?,, A, and (1 — a,), i = 1,2, in the first 
two equations are not identified and the remaining parameters k{\, ki2 and £,-3, 
i = 1,2, are just identified. The restrictions needed for identification of the first two 
equations can of course be of different types and will vary in different industries. 
Let us suppose a = a,- = dj and /? = / ? ,= (3j, that is, the effects of informative 
and predatory advertising on sales are equal for both firms. These conditions seem 
reasonable as both competitors usually use the same media for their advertising. 
Different combinations of restrictions such as a,- = ctj = 0 , /?,• = (3j = D, a{ = ctj 
or K{ = Kj, which also lead to identification of the first two equation, seem more 
restrictive. 





U.\ « 2 Xi_ . 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
« 2 lí.l 0 0 x.2_x 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 X.\ X.2 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X.\ X.2 1 
a 
0 
1 — ai 
Ai 













. U ' 4 . 
?ia 0 0 Ьll 
0 z2 0 h + г; = Z*b + v 
0 0 Zз 64 _ 
(12) 
where X.i,X.2,u.i,u.2,v.i,v.2,v.3 and u.4 are ( T — 1) x 1 vectors of values Xit,X2t, 
uu, u2t, vu, V2t, V3t and v4t respectively (t = 2 , 3 , . . . , T ) . T is the number of ob­
servations and the subscript —1 for X\_l and x2_i denotes the one period lagged 
values of xi and X2. Matrices Z12, Z3, Z4 are submatrices of Z* defined according 
to 612 = (a, 0,1 - ai, /__,_ - a2,I<2)', b3 = (ki2,ki3,kii)' and b4 = (k22, &23, k2i)'. 
We can write system (12) in the usual structural form as: 
YV + XD = V, (13) 
where Y, X and V are respectively the ( ( T - 1) x 4), ((T- 1) x 3) and ( ( T - 1) x 4) 
matrices of the endogenous variables, predetermined variables (including constant 
term) and disturbances. The tfth rows of Y, X and V are yt. = (Xu,X2t, - i t , it%t), 
xt. = ( x i i ( t _ i ) , x 2 ) ( t - i ) , 1)
 a n d vt. = (vlt,v2t,V3t,v4t) respectively. The matrices of 
unknown parameters are defined as: 
Г = 
D 
The reduced form of the model is: 
1 0 -k12 -k22 
0 1 - & i з -&23 
-a -ß 1 0 
-ß -a 0 1 
- ( 1 - a i ) 0 0 0 
0 - ( l - a 2 ) 0 0 
- K i -I<2 -kn -k2i 
Y = Xïl + W, 
(14) 
(15) 
where II = — D r - 1 and W = VT-1. The properties of the structural disturbances 
V obviously determine the selection of the estimation procedure. There are only 
two predetermined (lagged endogenous) variables Xlt(t-]_) and x2,(t-i)
 s o tha t the 
presence of autocorrelation in the disturbances leads to inconsistency of the usual 
procedures (such as 2SLS or 3SLS) used in empirical applications. The presence 
of autocorrelation in the structural disturbances U can easily be detected through 
the reduced form disturbances V. Note that all elements of T - 1 are non-zero, so 
that autocorrelation in vlt, v2t, v3t or v4t leads to the presence of autocorrelation in 
all four elements of error terms included in W. I will now describe the estimation 
procedure for the case of autocorrelation as this is the method which will be used in 
the next section for estimating model (12) using da ta from the German automobile 
industry. 
Write equations (13) compactly as. 
ZA = V, (16) 
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where Z = (Y, Y_i, 1) is (T — 1) x 9 matrix with tth row defined as 
Zt- = ( x l t , x2t, " i t , U2t, xl,(t-l), x2,(l-l), Wl,(|-1), u2,(.-l)> l ) 
The corresponding matrix _4 is: 
A = 
1 0 - * 1 2 -k22 
0 1 - * i з - & 2 3 
—а -/? 1 0 
-ß —а 0 1 
( 1 - a i ) 0 0 0 
0 - ( 1 - a 2) 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
- A i -K2 -kn - * 2 1 
(17) 
About V in (17) we assume that 
V = V-iR + E, (18) 
where R is a stable (4 x 4) matrix of unknown coefficients. I do not impose any a 
priori restriction on the form of R so that any element of vt. can be correlated not 
onlv with its own one period lagged value but also with one period lagged values of 
the other elements of vt.. Vector et. = (eit,e2t,e3t, e^) is the tth row of the matrix 
E of order ((T — 1) x 4) and the following assumptions about its elements are made: 
1. 8(E) = 0; 
2. £(et.e't.) = S ® / ) f = 2 , . . .T ; 
3. 8(et.e's.) = 0, t, s = 2 , . . .T, t -_ s. 
The tth equation can be rewritten as1 
y.i = Zi6i+v.i, i= 12,3,4 (19) 
where y.i and v.i are the ith columns, respectively, of Y and V. The matrix Zi and 
the vector _,- are defined as 
Zi = (Yi,Yi_1,l) ói = (b'i,c'i,ďi)', i - 1 2 , 3 , 4 (20) 
with Yi and Y,^ being submatrices of Y and Y_i respectively, corresponding to 
the variables included in the ith equation and &.;, c.,- and d.; are the corresponding 
non-zero parameters of the ith equation. The complete system 
y=Z*6 + v, (21) 
x T h e subscript 12 is used for the first two equations as they must be treated together because 
of the cross-equation identification restriction. 
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where y = vec(Y), v = vec(V), Z* = diag(Zi2, Z3, Z4) and 6 = (S'\2,S'3,6'4)' is 
nothing more than form (12) of the system. 
There are different approaches for estimating the model (16) under assumption 
(18). The maximum likelihood (ML) approach, described in [23], involves many 
computational difficulties, so that a lot of simpler and relative to the maximum 
likelihood asymptotically efficient estimators have been proposed in the literature. 
Some of these estimators are for example the three-stage-least-squares-like estimator, 
termed the full information dynamic autoregressive (FIDA) estimator, and the con-
verging iterate of FIDA estimator, called CIFIDA. These estimators are described 
in [7] and [8]. In the first paper the authors describe the FIDA estimator, compare 
it to the ML estimator and derive the asymptotic distribution of the FIDA estima-
tor. In the second study, the authors extend the previous work, showing that the 
asymptotic distribution of the CIFIDA and ML estimator are identical and provide 
a simple two step procedure which is fully efficient as CIFIDA and ML estimators. 
The equations defining the FIDA estimates are obtained by minimizing 
tr YTX(ZA-Z-\AR)'(ZA-Z-\AR) (22) 
with respect to the unknown parameters of A subject to prior estimates of E and 
R. The matrix Z in (22) is defined as Z = (Y, Y_i, 1), where 
Y = Q(QQ)'1Q'Y (23) 
and the tth row of the ((T — 2) x 9) matrix Q is 
Qt = ( ^ l . ( t - l ) , x2,(t-l), « l , ( t - l ) i w 2 , ( t - l ) , ^ l , ( t - 2 ) , ^ 2 , ( t - 2 ) , « l , ( t -2 ) i W 2 |( t-2) , l ) • 
Note the similarity to the 3SLS estimator, as combining (16) and (18) we get ZA — 
V-\R = E which is the same as ZA — Z-\AR=E (as Z-\A = V-\). This expression 
is a part of the well known OLS criteria with the slight difference that in (22) the 
endogenous variables Z are "purged" of their stochastic components, using Z instead 
of Z. The matrix Z contains the predicted values of the endogenous variables from 
the reduced form of the model where the lag structure in the error process is reduced. 
From (13) and (18) we get YT + XD- V-\R = E and using Y-\T + X-\D = V-\ 
the reduced form when the autocorrelation process of V is eliminated is: 
Y = -XDT~1 +Y-\TRT-1 + X-\DRT-1 ^ET-1. (24) 
The right hand side variables of this reduced form are the columns of Q. 
The FIDA estimator of S is defined as: 
6FIDA = (G' ( f r ^ i r - i ) G)-lG' ( i T 1 ® 7T_i) g, (25) 
where 
G = Z* -(R®IT-i)Z*1 (26) 
g = y-(R®IT-\)y-\. (27) 
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The matrix Z* denotes the matrix Z* (see (12)) except that the current endogenous 
variables Y are replaced by their predicted values Y. To complete the estimation 
scheme the formulae for estimating R and S are given as: 
R = {AZ'_1Z-iA)-
1AZLiZA (28) 
E = —— {ZA - Z.1AR)'{ZA - Z-iAR) (29) 
The first formula represents simple OLS regressions of every element of vt. on one pe-
riod lagged values of all elements of vt., that is on (ui,(t_i), fl2,(.-i)> ̂ 3,(1-1), ^4,(t-i)) 
and the second formula is the usual estimator of the covariance matrix which uses 
the residuals from the four previous regressions (28). 
The estimation procedure should start with a consistent estimate of A, say A^ 
which enables to us to obtain consistent estimates of R and X. (see (28) and (29)) 
and subsequently apply (25). This procedure yields a consistent estimator of 8, R 
and S. If we want to get asymptotically efficient estimations we have to iterate 
back and forth between the estimates of the structural coefficient A and the matrix 
R using (25) and (28). The result of these iterations would be the CIFIDA esti-
mations. Convergence is, however, not guaranteed from iterating (see [14]). [18] and 
[8] propose a simple two step procedure which is fully as efficient as CIFIDA and 
ML estimators and is a natural extension of the result in [6] and [17]. 
The first step of this simple two step method is the same as in the previous case. 
1. Estimate by instrumental variables (16) to get a consistent estimate of A de-
noted i ( ° \ Then compute R^ and X.(0) u s i n g (28) and (29). 
2. Compute the predicted value of the current endogenous variables using (23). 
Form the matrices G and V = ZA^> and the vector g using the initial estima-
tion H(°) and E(°). Then run generalized least squares. 
*w = (Jm ) * w 
= ((G, U ® V_i)'(_](0) ® IT-i)-1^, I4 <S> V-i))'
1 
• (G, U ® V-i)' (S ( 0 ) ® IT-i) _ 1 9- (31) 
The final estimation of this two step procedure is: 
V vec(H/) ) = { vec(I^(°)) + vec(H(1)) J " ( 3 2 ) 
Note that the second step takes into account the parts of the terms V-iR which may 
not have been eliminated by transformations (26) and (27) because of the initial inef-
ficient IV estimation. These transformations are simple multivariate generalizations 
of the single equation quasi-differences used in very well known Cochrane-Orcutt 
procedure modified by [17] allowing for the presence of lagged endogenous variables 
in the model. 
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As shown in [8] and [18] the asymptotic covariance matrix of the full informa-
tion maximum likelihood estimator of (8', vec(R)')' denoted D71 coincides with the 
asymptotic covariance matrix of (6* , vec(H/ )'. The matrix D$ is defined as: 
D+={ P{ E " 1 ^ ) ' ( 3 3 ) 
where 
M = plimT"1 (G1 (Y,®IT-IT1G) 
Pi = plimT-1 ( G ' C E ^ / T - I ) - 1 ^ ® ^ ! ) ) 
oo 
n = s(u't.ut.) = ^2R"ER. 
j=o 
The objective of this paper is to test model misspecification, that is: do the observed 
data confirm simultaneity between sales levels and advertising expenditures? The 
possible misspecification of the model (8)-(11) can be detected by the [19] spec-
ification test. This test rests on a comparison of limited information (LI) to full 
information (FI) estimators. The null hypothesis is a correct specification of the 
model. Under the null hypothesis the FI estimator is efficient but yields inconsistent 
estimates of all equations if one of them is misspecified. On the other hand the LI 
estimator is not efficient as it does not take into account the correlation among error 
terms of different equations of the system. However only the misspecified equa-
tion is estimated inconsistently, that is, any specification error is not propagated 
throughout the model. 
Denote the LI estimator by <5LI and the FI estimator by <5FI. The Hausman 
specification test can be then defined by the following statistic 
m = (SLl-8F1)'V-
1(8Ll-8Fl). (34) 
The matrix V is a consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix of (<$LI — 
6FI). Under the null hypothesis of no misspecification the m statistic is distributed 
asymptotically x2 with K degrees of freedom, where K is the dimension of the 
vector (<!>LI — <5FI)- In our case the LI estimator will be the initial equation by 
equation IV estimation and the FI estimator will be the asymptotically efficient two 
step estimator 6*. 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The objective of this section is to estimate the parameters of the model proposed 
in Section 2 and to test the model misspecification using data from two major com-
petitors in the German automobile industry (Volkswagen-Opel GM). The analyzed 
market is the medium car market in Germany for the period from January 1993 to 
July 1995. Two models, VW-Golf and Opel Astra, accounted for a large part of in-
dustry sales (more than 60 % for the period under study) whereas other competitors 
in this market, such as the BMW 316-325 with 12% and the Ford Escort with 9%, 
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were left behind. Hence, the assumption of a duopoly market can be accepted. Sales 
are monthly data obtained from the Report of New Car Registration in Germany 
which is a detailed report by car models and manufacturers. The first series (Xi) 
VW Golf includes all Golf III, Kombi and Variant models and the second one (X2) 
all Opel Astra Models. The advertising expenditures data2 are the observed number 
of pages (newspapers, journals) minutes (TV, Radio) and posters, devoted to the 
advertising of the models under study, multiplied by the official (for us unknown) 
price of one page, minute or poster. Therefore, both series wi (advertising expen-
ditures for Golf) and U2 (advertising expenditures for Astra) are values in DM and 
represent advertising efforts of the competitors. 
Figures 1 and 2 plot sales and advertising data3 deflated by consumer price index4. 
F i g . 1 . Sales for V W Golf and Opel Astra . 
F i g . 2 . Advertising for V W Golf and Opel Astra . 
First of all the four equations of the reduced form of the system (15) were estimat-
ed by OLS to test for the presence of autocorrelation in the error terms W. Because 
Source: Zulassungen von fabrikneuen Personenkraftwagen in Deutschland nach Herstellern und 
Typgruppen, published by Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt. 
2Source: Nielsen Werbeforschung S-fP GmbH, Hamburg 
3 I am not authorized to publish the advertising expenditure data, so the scale of the vertical 
axis cannot be given. 
4 Source: CD-ROM International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
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of the presence of the lagged endogenous variables in these regressions the following 
(well known Durbin's) approach was used for doing it. I regressed residuals from 
the above regressions on their own lagged values and all variables included in the re-
duced form (15), tha t is 1, Xin-u and x2,(t-i)- Then I tested the joint significance 
of the coefficients on the lagged residuals with the standard F test. In the third 
and fourth equation the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation was rejected. The 
presence of autocorrelation in the reduced form implies presence of autocorrelation 
in the structural form (as W = V T - 1 ) . In such a situation the application of usual 
methods (2SLS, 3SLS) leads to inconsistent estimations, so I used the procedure 
described in the previous section. 
All estimators based on the transformations (26) and (27) such as the CIFIDA 
or the full information two step estimator described in the previous section need a 
consistent initial estimation of the structural parameters. There are many ways in 
which this can be done. The technique usually used is to treat the lagged endogenous 
variables as endogenous, and estimate each equation of the system by IV ignoring 
the autoregressive structure of the disturbances. This yields a consistent estimation 
of the structural parameters as only exogenous and lagged exogenous variables are 
used as instruments. There are of course other techniques which can be used in 
special cases. If the matr ix R is diagonal a simple grid method can be used, as 
the elements of R are between minus one and one and the equations can be treated 
separately ([13]). 
Note however that apart from the constant terms there are only endogenous 
and lagged endogenous variables in the system ( 8 ) - ( 1 1 ) . Obviously, some new 
information must be used for the initial IV estimation. This information cannot be 
included in the structural form of the system as the relations ( 8 ) - ( 1 1 ) are assumed 
to be well specified and the inclusion of new exogenous variables would make it 
impossible to compare the empirical results with the theoretical conclusions -(see 
Table 1). The solution adopted here is the use of three deterministic variables 
(constant, trend and dummy variables for July and August) to get valid instruments 
needed for the initial estimation. Sales and advertising activities usually decrease in 
the vacational period so tha t the selection of this variable is quite reasonable. To get 
valid instruments X\t, x2t, « i , and u^t we just regress the endogenous variables Xu, 
x2t, uu and U2t on constant, trend and dummy variables for the summer months 
and use these estimations for computing the predicted values of the endogenous 
variables. Let Z denote the matr ix Z except for the replacement of the current 
and lagged endogenous variables by their predicted values. The initial estimation 
8 is defined as Siv = (Z'Z)~xZ'y. The residuals from this regression are used 
for the estimation of Cl. The asymptotic covariance matr ix of div is computed 
as acov(Siv) = (Z'Z)~1(Z'QZ)(ZIZ)~l. The initial IV estimations of the system 
( 8 ) - ( 1 1 ) is (standard deviation in parenthesis): 
Xu = 0.82 ult+ 0.41 u2t- 3278.36 + 0.90 Xh^i) + vu (35) 
(0.85) ( 1 0 7 ) (12248.54) (0.39) 
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X2t = 0.82 u2t+ 0.41 uu- 6361.76 + 0.95 X2,(t-i) + ht (36) 
(0.85) ( 1 0 7 ) (8679.87) (0.49) 
ult = -2120.66 + 0.44 Xu - 0.27 X2t + v3t (37) 
(6884.72) (1.03) (1.67) 
u2t = 404.96 + 1.67 Xlt- 2A7X2t + v4t. (38) 
(3474.13) (0.52) (0.84) 
The estimations (35)-(38) imply that z = 0.62 and w = 0.20, that is both effects 
of advertising (informative and competitive) are present but the informative effect 
is higher. The estimations of decay terms are a\ = 0.10 and a2 = 0.05, that is, both 
stocks of goodwill depreciate very slowly. 
In [12] equilibrium feedback strategies were obtained for some extreme cases such 
as informative (it;,- = Wj = 0) and predatory (zi = Zj = 0) advertising for symmetric 
firms. The equilibrium feedback strategies for the general asymmetric case (zi ^ Wi, 
Zi ^ Zj, Wi ^ Wj and Zj, Wi / 0) were not given because it is impossible to obtain 
the parameters c'-, j = 2,3,... ,6, i = 1,2 in (4) analytically in such situation. 
The strategies defined in Table 1 show that the presence of competitive advertising 
implies negative reaction to the rival's sales. This is the explanation for the negative 
coefficient of X2t in (37). The negative reaction of firm 2 to its own sales has no 
relation to Table 1. The explanation however could be that firm 2 increases its 
advertising effort when sales decreases and vice versa. This case does not appear in 
the Table 1 but is clearly possible if z2, w2 ^ 0 and z2 ^ w2 (see (4)). 
In general, the precision of the estimation increases considerably in the following 
two step estimation: 
Xlt = 0.36 uu+ 0.34 u2t + 12304.23 + 0.44 xi,(t-i) + e l t (39) 
(0.24) (0.32) (6296.76) (0.18) 
X2t = 0.36 u2t+ 0.34 un+ 5163.01 + 0.51 X2>(t_1) + e2t (40) 
(0 . 2 4) (0.32) (3781.16) (0.21) 
ult = -7161.76 + 0.20 Xlt+ 0.38 X2t + e3t (41) 
(10259.09) (0.23) (0.53) 
u2t = -11520.69 + 1.47 Xu - 1-46 X2t + e4t. (42) 
(17446.78) (0.46) (0.98) 
The corresponding estimation of the matrix R is: 
/ -0.28 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 \ 
-0.24 -0.12 -0.19 -0.17 
0.46 -0.35 0.67 0.32 
\ -0.23 0.23 -0.29 0.06 J 
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The highest element T33 says tha t the strongest dependence on the one period lagged 
value corresponds to ^3*. The reason is probably the two huge peaks in the adver-
tising expenditures series of the Golf model in the last months of 1993 and spring 
1994 . 
As expected, the s tandard deviations of these FI estimations decrease. The es-
timations of the coefficients of the informative and predatory effect of advertising 
are z = 0.35 and w = 0.01 respectively. The surprisingly high informative effect of 
advertising in this very competitive market can be explained by inclusion of exhibi-
tions of new (by the consumers unknown) elements in car advertising such as ABS, 
side bars or airbag which explain what these elements are useful for, and thus, also 
inform the rival's customers as the car characteristics are very similar. 
The estimations of the decay term a\ = 0.56 and 02 = 0.49 are higher than in the 
LI estimation and indicate that both stocks of goodwill depreciate at approximately 
the same rate. The estimated feedback strategies (41) - (42) show a slightly different 
behavior than in LI estimation. Firm 1 reacts positively to both own and rival's 
sales. This reaction resembles the optimal feedback strategy in the extreme case of 
informative advertising, where the positive reaction to the rival's sales works as a 
promise of cooperation (see Table 1). The explanation of the signs in (42) does not 
change with respect to the previous LI case. 
It is important to highlight tha t the selection of the additional deterministic 
variables used for the initial estimation by IV has very little impact on the final 
results. I estimated the above model using the CIFIDA estimator start ing with 
different initial values A^> and, when convergence was reached, the results were 
very similar to the presented in (39 ) - (42 ) . The common results in all converged 
estimations for this market were: the informative effect of advertising is higher than 
the predatory effect, the decay terms are similar for both firms (about 0.5) and the 
first firm reacts positively to its own and rival's sales. The initial values AW used for 
this CIFIDA iterations were of different natures. First I tried different "reasonable" 
expected values set completely ad hoc. Then I used grid method for the elements 
of R estimating equation by equation. This is a generalization of the procedure 
proposed in [13]. Simply transform the original variables according to (26) and (27) 
forming the "multivariate" quasi-differences and estimate every equation for different 
values of r,-j involved in every equation. Then choose those values of r2j and the 
corresponding estimates of 8i which yield the smallest sum of squared residuals. The 
first two equations involved 8 unknown elements of R (the first two rows of R) and 
the third and fourth equation only 4 elements (the third and fourth row of R). Note 
that the grid for the first two equations was not very dense as 10 possible values 
of every r 4 j , (i = 1,2; j = 1,2,3,4) implied 10
8 iterations. Nevertheless, this grid 
procedure yielded a good initial values for the CIFIDA iterations. 
I will turn now to the testing of misspecification in the estimated model. The 
LI and FI estimators <5LI and <$FI are defined by 8iy and 6*. The estimator of the 
asymptotic covariance matr ix of (8jy — 8^) is V = &COV(8JV) — acov(<5f), where 
acov(<v) is computed as (G1 ( S _ 1 <g) Ir-i) G)~l (see (33)). The value of the Haus-
man specification statistic m is 1.84. This means that the null hypothesis of no 
misspecification cannot be rejected at 5%, as the critical value for 12 degrees of 
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freedom is 21.0. Tha t is, the observed da ta from the German car industry confirm 
not only the correct definition of the kinematic equations of the model (1) but also 
the correct specification of the linear feedback strategies (7). The fact that the data 
are in accordance with the linear form of the equilibrium feedback strategies is im-
portant , since the functional form of the equations (7) is determined by the value 
functions, which appear as unknown arguments in the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman 
equation. The only way to solve this equation for the above model is by propos-
ing the functional form of the value functions as a quadratic polynom of the state 
variables ( x i , x 2 ) - The empirical evidence then supports this proposal. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The main result of this paper is tha t the Nash equilibrium assumption is consistent 
with the da ta used in the estimation and provides empirical support for the the-
oretical model defined in the form of the sales advertising response model. Other 
implication of the results is tha t advertising expenditures must be considered endoge-
nous in a similar type of da ta as ignoring simultaneity between response functions 
and equilibrium conditions would lead to inconsistency in the parameter estimates. 
This means that in situations in which the frequency of the data coincides with the 
decision-making horizon (as it is in our case) a simultaneous equation approach is 
needed, since the advertising decision rules are based on expected sales, creating 
simultaneity in advertising and sales (see [1]). 
The parameter estimations for the German automobile industry indicate a sur-
prisingly high informative effect of advertising not expected in such a competitive 
market and the majority of the estimated signs in the feedback strategies coincide 
with the analytically derived optimal strategies. The proposed approach can easily 
be used for data from other industries and surely helps to understand advertising-
sales relationships a little better. 
(Received April 15, 1997.) 
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